When Pipia signed the Letter of Assent-A, NECA and the Union were parties to a collective agreement that entered into force from 3 June 1987 to 31 May 1989.   NECA and the Union have concluded a continuous series of successor agreements, including one with effect from 4 June 1995 to 31 May 1998 (“1995 Agreement”).   The 1995 agreement “applies to all companies that have signed a letter of consent” authorising NECA to negotiate with the Union on their behalf.  (A.J. to 311.)   The defendant had not notified NECA or the European Union of a written denunciation of the letter of consent before the entry into force of the 1995 Agreement. The arguments put forward by the defendant before the Court do not convince us otherwise.   First, the defendant claims that it is not bound by successive agreements between NECA and the European Union, since the letter of Aseannt-A is merely the defendant`s promise to recognise the European Union if it were granted majority status.   In this context, the defendant argues that, from the outset, the union attempted to establish a majority relationship with the defendant, which is a relationship under Article 9(a) and not a relationship under Article 8(f), given that the letter of approval is expressly made: “If a majority of its workers authorize the local union: The employer will recognize the local union as the exclusive responsibility for collective bargaining for all employees. (A.J.

at 102.)   However, what the defendant does not take into account is that it ruled on Assent-A`s letter pursuant to Article 8(f) because it did not have majority status at that time.   See City Elec., Inc. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 288 NLRB 443, 444 (1988) (288 NLRB 444 (1988) (finding that the relationship between [the employer] and the [u]nion was governed by section 8(f) of the Act, because the employer “worked in the construction industry and had established its contractual relationship with the [u]nion at a time when the majority status of the [u] nion had not yet been established; not Section 9(a)”). In addition, the board decided that the second point of the exclusion test for this affirmative defence decision was fulfilled.   In other words, if the Board had found that the defendant had borne her burden in the exercise of this affirmative defence, the Board would not necessarily have been able to find that the respondent had breached subsections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to comply with the agreement.  Olchowik, 875 F.2d to 558.   Contrary to the defendant`s claim, the Chamber`s defence decision was not a mere ex post facto idea;  it was essential to the conclusion of the Management Board.   Finally, the third point of the exclusion test is met because the accused had a full and fair opportunity to present and argue his defence before the ALJ. Are you forced to work too many hours? Do you receive overtime pay? Do you have health insurance benefits? Do you work in precarious working conditions? Do you have a construction site representation? Are you building a future by gaining benefits?  In this case, Pipia`s testimony essentially amounts to asserting that he did not know the nature of the agreement to which he subscribed when he signed the letter of approval.   To show innocent ignorance, the party invoking the defense must prove that it has assumed its “fundamental responsibility” to verify a document before signing.

 Hetchkop, 116 F.3d 34 years old.   The defendant has not demonstrated that Pipia assumed its fundamental responsibility in verifying Assent-A`s letter. . . .